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The ‘Velvet Revolution’ and the Limits of  
Rational Choice Models 
 
STEVEN SAXONBERG* 
Uppsala University, Sweden 
Abstract: This article examines the limitations of two rational choice models in ex-
plaining the ‘Velvet Revolution’ in Czechoslovakia. The article is partially based on 
interviews with former student leaders and Civic Forum activists carried out in the 
springs of 1992 and 1993. Two important conclusions are, firstly, that in non-violent 
revolutions like the one that occurred in Czechoslovakia, the main collective action 
problem for political entrepreneurs is communication rather than collective incen-
tives. Secondly, rationalist models need to take into account the time factor. The 
utility of participating in a revolution can vary over time. 
Czech Sociological Review, 1999, Vol. 7 (No. 1: 23-36) 
Introduction 
In recent years, rational choice models have become increasingly popular in the field of 
political sociology. At the same time, recent events, such as the collapse of the commu-
nist-led regimes, have made clear some of the weaknesses of the rationalist approach. 
This article focuses on one aspect of rational choice models: their ability to explain quick, 
non-violent revolutions. The Czechoslovak ‘Velvet Revolution’ of 1989 provides a recent 
example that illuminates these limitations. 
This article focuses on the two most common rationalist approaches to revolutions: 
the ‘free-rider’ and threshold models. The free-rider approach keeps the assumption of the 
public choice school in economics, which holds that all actors are rational egoists. The 
threshold model also assumes rational behaviour, but it allows for non-egoist preferences, 
such as altruism, ‘Kantian’, utilitarianism and so on. 
The Free-Rider Problem 
In the traditional public choice models developed by economists, all actors are considered 
egoists, whose actions are motivated by rational calculation. Consequently, collective 
action – including demonstrations and revolutions – is usually seen as a free-rider prob-
lem. Although a group as a whole would gain by solidarity, each individual has an incen-
tive to let others do the dirty work. According to this logic, the cost of participating is 
high, while the cumulative effect of that one person’s involvement is marginal. If a 
woman knows that she would be better off if one million people demonstrated for a par-
ticular issue, but at the same time calculates that her joining the manifestation would only 
increase the total by 0.0001% (1/1,000,000x100), she will realise that her additional pres-
ence will make no difference to the outcome; yet if everyone thought that way, nobody 
would demonstrate. 
                                                     
*) Direct all correspondence to Dr. Steven Saxonberg, Department of Government, Uppsala Uni-
versity, Box 514, 751 20 Uppsala, Sweden, fax (+4618) 471 3308, e-mail steven.saxonberg 
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Potential revolutionaries can overcome the free-rider problem through some system 
of sanctions and rewards to encourage participation. This can either be done collectively, 
if it is a small group of people who can easily monitor the behaviour of its members, or if 
political entrepreneurs are able to give “selective incentives”. Taylor [1988: 67] considers 
both conditions necessary. 
Thus, for the selective incentives to work, the following assumptions are necessary: 
1) participation must be felt as a cost rather than a benefit,1 
2) it must be possible to monitor participation, 
3) political entrepreneurs must be able to give rewards and punishments, 
4) people become political entrepreneurs because they believe it will further their ca-
reers.2 
This last condition is a corollary of the egoistic assumption, since once that assumption is 
dropped, it becomes possible for an altruist to become a political entrepreneur who is not 
concerned about future career prospects. 
If any of the above four assumptions fail to hold up, then the entire public choice 
approach to a case study is invalidated. My argument, however, is not limited to the claim 
that one of the criterion is not met in the cases of Czechoslovakia and East Germany, 
rather, it is that none of the criteria are met. 
1) The most important notion in the free-rider approach is that the cost of partici-
pating dissuades most people from participating in a revolt. Since the major activity of 
the majority of the participants in the ‘Velvet Revolution’ was to attend mass demonstra-
tions, there is no reason to assume that attending them was experienced by all or even 
most of its participants as a cost. Even Taylor [1988: 86] admits that demonstrations are 
problematic. In contrast to many other forms of collective action, public manifestations 
can actually give pleasure. For many citizens of these countries, it was the first time in 
their lives that they could openly express their opinion by taking part in a form of politi-
cal collective action which was not sanctioned by the state. This type of non-violent, 
‘velvet’ revolution involved totally different cost-benefit calculations than participation in 
the usual sort of violent, military-based revolt. 
2) In contrast to the type of jungle-warfare practised by the Vietnamese described 
by Taylor, in which guerrilla support was organised in small village communities, moni-
toring of the participants of mass demonstrations is an extremely difficult task. At the 
official, Communist-led mass rallies, citizens usually marched together with their col-
leagues from the workplace, making it easy for local party officials to keep track of eve-
ryone. In Czechoslovakia, however, the demonstrations took place after working hours; 
and organised marches from the workplace to the rallying points were rare. Not only was 
it impossible for the political entrepreneurs to monitor participation, it was also impossi-
ble for the community members to uncover and punish free-riders. In contrast to the small 
Vietnamese villages which Taylor discusses, the revolutionary centres of the Czechoslo-
                                                     
1) Cf. Taylor [1988: 85-86]: the public choice approach excludes “action taken where the pleasure 
of the act itself gives important benefits, instead of them being limited to the consequences of the 
action”. 
2) Cf. Hardin [1982: 35] “Political entrepreneurs are people who, for their own career reason, find 
it in their private interest to work to provide collective benefits to relevant groups.” 
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vak revolution, were large cities, such as Prague, Bratislava, and Brno. It was nearly im-
possible for community members to keep track of the hundreds of thousands of partici-
pants in these demonstrations. 
3) So far, I have discussed the difficulty for anyone to monitor participation in 
mass demonstrations; the concept of political entrepreneurs, however, requires more than 
the ability to keep track of supporters and opponents, it also requires the ability to give 
selective incentives to them. This task is much easier for traditional types of revolutionary 
organisations, such as Leninist, fascist and national liberation movements, than for the 
organisers of the Czechoslovak revolution of 1989. For example, before coming to power 
Leninist parties were highly disciplined and centralised groups, with clear lines of author-
ity and clear goals of obtaining power and changing society. Through their tight organisa-
tion they could deliver selective incentives to their activists and pressure others into 
joining them. Moreover, during their first years in power they had the additional advan-
tage of being able to reward people who had helped them in conquering the state by offer-
ing them high positions, while punishing their enemies through repressive measures. 
In contrast, the Czech ‘Civic Forum’ (Občanské fórum or OF) and the Slovak ‘Pub-
lic Against Violence’ (Verejnost proti násiliu or VPN), were all loosely-knit organisa-
tions, without any clear goals or strategies, and without even clear membership. None of 
these organisations had worked out a political or economic program during the initial 
period of mass demonstrations. Rather than striving to conquer the state, they demanded 
future elections and the resignation of the most hard-line leaders. Not aiming for their 
organisations to obtain power, they could hardly be in the position of giving selective 
incentives in the form of future rewards. 
Far from the usual image of power-hungry revolutionaries, many of these leaders 
did not even want power in the beginning. In Slovakia, VPN actually refused to partici-
pate in the national government until after the elections over half a year later [interview 
with Gál], while the Czech OF felt it needed at least six months before it could be pre-
pared for the responsibility of ruling [Draper 1993: 16-17].3 Even then, they were not sure 
that they should be the ones to have power, they simply wanted to have democratic elec-
tions. 
4) So instead of being able to give selective incentives, it is doubtful if the main 
dissidents-turned-politicians became active in order to further their careers by striving 
for power. For example, even though Havel founded OF and became president because of 
its later demand, he was not sure that he would support his own creation in the upcoming 
elections [interviews with Fišera and Pithart]. Even his decision to become president him-
self, was uncertain; dissidents spent several days trying to persuade the “reluctant presi-
dent.”4 So in contrast to the normal picture of revolutionaries plotting to take over, OF’s 
                                                     
3) Horáček, Pithart and Gabal all indicated to me in interviews that OF was caught off guard by the 
sudden collapse of the Communist Party and that they were not prepared for the sudden need to 
take governmental responsibility. None of them, however, mentioned the six-month preparation 
period. Nevertheless, this seems like a realistic account, since they demanded that elections be 
held first around six months later. 
4) That is the title of a book by Simmons [1991]. Unfortunately, his account of the actual manner 
in which Havel was convinced to take on the position has not been verified by any of my inter-
views or the published sources which I have read. My account is based on interviews with 
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‘leaders’ were reluctantly forced into taking responsibility for the government, when they 
saw that the Communist Party was unable to renew itself after the resignation of its Polit-
buro and the ensuing inflexible attitude of Prime Minister Adamec in proposing a new 
cabinet [interview with Gabal, cf. interview with Žák]. 
The Free Rider Problem and the Student Strike 
If public choice fares poorly for the case of mass demonstrations and dissidents-turned-
revolutionaries, at least it might do better in explaining the student strike. After all, uni-
versity faculties are small enough to allow both the strike leaders and the school admini-
stration to keep tabs to some extent on the participants. This may seem similar to Taylor’s 
“small communities”, in which those going against the stream can be frozen out. 
Even though the faculties in a sense resembled small communities, the continu-
ously changing composition of the student body makes social sanctions implausible. 
Many of the students knew it would be their last year, and none of them except potential 
graduate students could have expected to stay more than four more years. Once they fin-
ished with their studies, they had little reason to believe that they would have much con-
tact with their former class-mates. Moreover, if the smallness of communities were a 
factor, a direct negative correlation between the size of faculties and extent of student 
participation should be expected. My interviews with student leaders, however, indicate 
no such correlation. For example, at the large Electro-technical Faculty of the Charles 
University with around 4000 students, according to Martin Benda, as much as 80% of the 
students were active at one point. Meanwhile at the smaller Pedagogical Faculty with 
between 1200-1500 students, Semin and Litvák claim that less than 15% were active. 
While this actually indicates a positive correlation between size and participation, another 
example points in the opposite direction: at the Economic University Löwenhöfer esti-
mates that between 200-300 of the approximately 5000 students were active in the strike, 
while at the Philosophical Faculty of Charles University, with half as many students, 
Ježek and Purnama claim that twice as many actively participated. So in contrast to the 
hypothesis that small communities promote greater co-operation, my interviews indicate 
that no correlation between size and participation existed.5 
Of course there are validity problems in asking student leaders after the event to es-
timate the percentage of participants. It would have been better if I could have sent ob-
servers to each of the faculties in order to count the number of participants in each event. 
However, these interviewees had no incentive to lie, so the only problem is their memory. 
It is very possible that the respondents might have erred by 20-30% in their estimates. 
Nevertheless, when a student claims that 80% of the students were active at the Electro-
technical Faculty and another student claims that only around 15% were at the Pedagogi-
cal Faculty, these differences are so large that it is still extremely likely that the former 
                                                                                                                                                 
Horáček, Kocáb, Pithart and Vondra, as well as such published sources as Der Spiegel [1990: 
178]. 
5) Of course, I am aware of the validity problems in conducting such interviews several years 
afterwards, but while not being able to definitely ‘falsify’ public choice on this point, I believe the 
burden of proof rests with its supporters. I can only point out that based on the available evidence 
– however scarce it may be – there is no reason to believe that public choice’s hypothesis was 
correct. 
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faculty had much higher participation rates than the latter. At the very least, we can claim 
that the available evidence points against the free-rider approach. 
Concerning the possibility of using rewards or punishments to promote co-
operation, the possibility of the strike leaders punishing non-participants was also limited, 
since they could not exactly drag them out of their dorms and summarily execute them. 
Similarly, since these leaders were not demanding any positions at the universities, they 
did not have any credible way of promising future rewards to prospective activists. 
The credibility of the university administration to punish potential strikers was 
much greater, than for the strike leaders. Yet, since the strikes were successful at least in 
all of Prague’s universities and their faculties, such tactics, if used, obviously did not 
work. According to strike leaders whom I interviewed at eight different faculties of three 
different universities or academies, not one of the deans directly threatened the strike 
leaders. Only one person (Vidím at the Economic University) claims to have been threat-
ened at any meeting, and it was done by a local Party functionary rather than a university 
official. In addition, at the Pedagogical Faculty, a general threat was made that the police 
could be called in [interviews with Štindl and Semin]. At the other faculties, the pattern 
seems to be that the deans either tried to persuade the students not to strike, but did not 
prevent them, or that they actually supported the strike, but tried to moderate its demands 
to exclude support for systemic change and to prevent co-operation with OF. At some of 
the faculties, the students even received a great deal of help from the teachers, although 
this varied from faculty to faculty, as did the attitudes of the deans. 
Finally, the question arises as to whether the students’ strike leaders were any more 
motivated by future gain than their dissident counterparts. Again, I cannot find any evi-
dence to back up this public choice assumption of political entrepreneurs. At all of the 
faculties – except for DAMU – the strike committees were comprised mostly of those 
participating in the preparations for the November 17 demonstration.6 These students had 
no idea that the demonstration would be such a large manifestation, nor did they believe 
that the police would intervene, since it was officially allowed and the Socialist Youth 
Organisation (SSM) had received assurances that the security police would keep away 
[Mohorita 1991: 30-31 and interview with him]. Rather than igniting a revolution, the 
organisers thought it would simply be the first among many activities to gain support for 
the legalisation of their independent student organisation STUHA [interviews with the 
Benda brothers]. The original calls for a student strike did not come from them, but rather 
from students at DAMU, who had not even participated in any of the preparations for the 
demonstration or any of the other student-oppositional activities before then. The STUHA 
members eventually supported the DAMU proposals, but even then, rather than expect 
the old regime to fall, most of those with whom I spoke insist they thought at first that 
reform communists would take over and limit the changes to a one-party Czechoslova-
kian version of perestroika [interview with, for example, Semin]. In addition, in common 
with the dissidents, most of the STUHA leaders had been politically engaged well before 
the strike, and thus had taken great risks to their careers at a time when their chances of 
success were slim. Finally, it should be noted, that if they really were basically motivated 
                                                     
6) Another important group within the strike committee was comprised by students who worked on 
semi-legal students newspapers, which were socially critical and run by independent students, but 
officially put out by the Socialist Youth Organisation SSM. Many of the independent students, 
however, were also members of the SSM [interviews with Ježek, Pajerová, Purnama and Doubek]. 
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by hopes of political power, then it would have been natural for them to follow the Hun-
garian example and start a youth party. Since they had won great respect for their role in 
the revolution, they most likely would have fared even better than the Hungarian FI-
DESZ.7 
The Importance of Communication 
As shown above, the collective action problem for the intellectuals was not the ability to 
find selective incentives to encourage workers to participate as in public choice theory. 
Rather, the collective action concern for the student leaders and dissidents became com-
munication. If they could spread their message to the populace, they believed they had a 
chance in succeeding. They had to inform the populace that (1) the police had brutally 
beaten students during a peaceful demonstration, (2) the ‘official’ version of the events 
was not true, (3) the students were on strike and had the support of musicians and actors, 
(4) a general strike was being planned on a particular date, (5) daily demonstrations were 
being organised and finally, (6) large crowds were attending these demonstrations, which 
shows that the revolt was gaining support. Spreading this information was a difficult task 
given the Communist Party’s control over the police, military, media and other means of 
mass communication. 
For example, a major goal of the students was to convince workers to participate in 
the general strike which they had set for Monday, November 27. The students had no way 
of rewarding or punishing workers for joining the strike. Nor did they possess any means 
for controlling which workers actually participated. The main concern for the students 
was simply to gain access to the factories in order to discuss the situation with the work-
ers. Thus, the students began by organising trips to factories. At first, it was often difficult 
to gain admittance, as the guards often refused to let the students in behind the gates. The 
student leaders came upon a unique solution: they arranged for famous actors and ac-
tresses to accompany them. Afterwards, it became much easier to enter the premises. The 
guards and workers might have been distrustful of young intellectual students, but they 
respected their heroes from film and TV. 
Not only did the students use famous celebrities to gain access to the factories, they 
quickly utilised other forms of communication to spread their message. There are count-
less examples. Already on the first evening, the famous dissident Petr Uhl used a phone 
to contact Western radio, which in turn broadcasted the event across the country. At most 
faculties the students seized the SSM’s communication facilities – with or without its 
consent. This included everything from SSM’s student radio, to its photocopying and fax 
machines. At the Economic University, the dean allowed the students to use the univer-
sity’s facilities as well, although he tried to prevent Charterists from appearing at the 
campus. At some faculties, teachers helped students translate their declarations into vari-
ous languages for the Western media. When the students visited the factories, they also 
came equipped with video films of the police’s violence.8 
Further help in communication came from the National Front parties, who quickly 
abandoned the sinking regime. Once the old institutional structures began to loosen, the 
                                                     
7) Professor Zbořil, who was elected advisor to the DAMU students during the strike, told me that 
he thinks it was a great mistake of the students that they did not start such a party. 
8) Based on interviews with Chalupa, Purnama, Rovná, Staňková, Urban, Zbořil and Zbořilová. 
The use of videos is also discussed in Horáček [1990: 54]. 
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allied parties no longer limited themselves to being loyal puppets of the regime. On Sun-
day, November 19 the Socialist Party Central Committee met and condemned the police 
intervention. They demanded political democracy and a guarantee against such further 
attacks [Fleyberk 1990: 21, the declaration is reprinted in Otál and Sládek 1990: 43-44]. 
The following day, the party’s newspaper Svobodné slovo began writing freely. On Tues-
day, the Socialist Party allowed OF to speak from the balcony of its publishing house at 
the main square, Václavské náměstí. 
The Threshold Model 
The most common way for rational choice theorists to explain revolutions when the free-
rider dilemma does not pose a problem is to substitute the demand for rational egoism 
with a more general one of instrumental rationality. Rather than needing to be egoistic, 
the actors can have other preferences such as altruism. Given a set of preferences, the 
actors behave rationally in the sense that they try to achieve their goals in the most effi-
cient (optimal) manner.9 In such a model, the goals themselves need not be rational, just 
the means of achieving them. In the “broad theory” favoured by Jon Elster, this requires 
rational reasoning in the choice of means as well as preferences. He writes [1989a: 25] 
that “we must require not only that beliefs be rational with respect to the available evi-
dence, but also that the amount of evidence collected be in some sense optimal”. 
In the case of collective action, Elster [1989b: ch 8; cf. 1989a: ch 5] divides citi-
zens into egoists, Kantians and utilitarists. Kantians choose to engage in collective action 
regardless of its consequences as long as they consider it a just cause. Meanwhile, utili-
tarists base their decision on how they expect it to influence society. If they feel that soci-
ety will benefit and that it has a good chance of succeeding, they will participate. On the 
other hand, if they think it will fail and lead to greater repression afterwards, they will 
abstain. 
Granovetter [1978] built on this idea of different values toward participating in col-
lective action. According to him, the decision of joining revolts varies in accordance to 
the amount of people who have already committed themselves. At the one extreme, some 
will demonstrate against the regimes regardless of both how much repression they may 
face and how little the chances of success may be. Others will have various ‘thresholds’ 
and decide to become engaged only when a certain level of participation has already been 
reached. The thresholds will vary from person to person. It can be graphically shown that 
only a slight change in thresholds – caused, for example, by changes in preferences or 
decreased perceived costs – is enough to radically increase the number of participants. 
According to Hermansson [1992: 231], this is exactly what happened in Eastern 
Europe. He notes: “All of the Eastern European states had civil rights organisations which 
continuously decided to protest despite hard repression.” Yet, that was not enough to 
spark off revolts, for in general: “As long as most of the citizens have significantly higher 
threshold levels than those of the civil rights movement’s core group, the majority of the 
citizens will most likely remain passive, keeping the opposition rather small and weak.” 
He presumes that the ‘snowball’ effect that was witnessed in East Germany and Czecho-
slovakia in 1989 as the size of the demonstrations quickly increased, was caused by 
                                                     
9) Elster [1983] gives three necessary conditions for rational preferences: they must be consistent 
(which requires transitivity), complete (for a pair of options, the actor can express preference for 
one of them or be indifferent to them) and they must have continuity. 
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changes in the perceived costs of participating, which in turn lowered the individual 
thresholds [Ibid.: 231-232]. 
A more detailed account of how the threshold model could be applied to Eastern 
Europe is provided by Kuran [1991], who shows how the threshold can be determined by 
the trade-off between private and public preferences. According to Kuran, the actor’s 
private preferences for toppling the regime are fixed at any moment, while the public 
preference is under his/her control. Since the two preferences can differ, this ‘preference 
falsification’ makes it hard to know what a person really thinks. The internal payoff is 
based on the psychological cost of preference falsification, while the external one de-
pends on the calculated personal rewards and costs of participating. The threshold point 
of joining the revolution comes where the external cost of joining falls below the internal 
cost of preference falsification. As in the original article by Granovetter, this threshold is 
based on the percentage of the population joining opposition. Kuran shows in a ten-
person example that if one person changes her private preferences because of “an un-
pleasant encounter at some government ministry,” it may be enough to spark off an unex-
pected revolution [Kuran 1991: 19]. 
The Granovetterian model has several advantages over its public choice competi-
tor. First of all, its assumption about different values and thresholds is more reasonable 
than the one of rational egoism. For example, it allows for political entrepreneurs, such as 
Havel who are driven by moralistic principles rather than personal gain. Secondly, it 
gives a reasonable explanation of the snowball effect, in which after the initial small 
demonstrations, their size rapidly grew. Similarly, the concept of lower perceived costs 
can explain why, for instance, demonstrations with around 10,000 participants in Prague 
in 1988 could not spark off a wider revolt, while a rally with only a few thousand more 
taking part 15 months later led to the downfall of the established order. 
Unfortunately, the threshold solution also raises a number of problems. First, it is 
difficult to test empirically and risks becoming tautological. After all, only two outcomes 
are possible: either a revolution succeeds or it fails. If it succeeds, it is caused by a change 
in threshold; if it fails, it is due to a lack of change. In a more nuanced form, one could 
compare snowball developments to ones of slower increases of participation. Then one 
could conclude that the differences were dependent on different threshold levels in these 
societies (perhaps one society had more Kantians than the other etc.). However, circular 
reasoning is unavoidable in these cases, since the assumptions are determined by the out-
comes. In defence of Granovetter, one could argue that in reality, it is difficult to formu-
late theories in a manner that they can be falsified by Popperian types of tests; instead, it 
is important that the theory provides a ‘reasonable’ explanation of the mechanisms behind 
actual events. In this case, ‘falsification’ depends on how reasonably the social scientist 
feels the theory explains a particular event. 
A second problem is not what it explains, but rather what it leaves out. If the main 
causes of revolutions turn out to be the original preferences (thresholds) and the changes 
in these thresholds (which often are caused by decreases in the costs of participating), 
then it is these two factors which need explaining. Threshold models, however, take these 
preferences for granted. Theorists using these models also tend to lack theories about 
when costs of participation decline. They often look at a particular event and note that 
since the number of people taking part in the revolt increased, then the costs of participa-
tion have decreased. Then they find a plausible explanation for the decline in costs. If 
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rational choice supporters want to give more than a purely historical, non-generalisable 
description of what happened, then they need to combine rationalist models with theories 
about preference formation and lowered costs (or in the words of Tarrow [1991], “politi-
cal openings”). One can imagine several types of approaches to these problems, such as 
adding institutional or cultural explanations of preference formation, or psychological 
explanations of when thresholds change. For example, theories of rising expectations 
could be fruitful. The point is simply that if social scientists using threshold models want 
to understand the underlying causes of a revolution, then the focal point of their research 
should be centred around the two issues of (1) preference formation and (2) changes in 
thresholds. 
A third problem with the threshold model is the time factor. The threshold model 
predicts that participation will continuously increase once a certain threshold is reached. 
However, as Opp [1993: 210] notes, this model cannot explain why in East Germany the 
number of demonstrators suddenly decreased after reaching their peak in early November 
1989. An obvious rationalist response would be that after the Wall was opened in early 
November, East Germans had less reason to demonstrate. But they could have just as well 
become even more encouraged and more willing to demonstrate, since they could more 
clearly see the results of their efforts. Moreover, until the regime agreed to free elections, 
they still had good reason to continue demonstrating. 
A reasonable hypothesis is that the utility of participating in demonstrations de-
creases with time. While it is fun to join mass manifestations against a repressive regime, 
for the majority of the population the novelty of shouting anti-governmental slogans 
wears off with time. 
My interviews indicate that there were three main groups of students, each possess-
ing different utility functions over time. The first were student leaders, the second were 
active participants and the third were passive supporters. 
The leaders resemble Elster’s Kantians, who were willing to participate regardless 
of the costs. Most of them had been involved in some sort of oppositional activity before 
the strike. Among these people, the utility of participation either increased with time, 
since they enjoyed the attention they were getting as revolutionary heroes, or at least 
stayed the same, since their level of activeness stayed the same until the strike ended sev-
eral months later. They acted as a pressure group on OF, which continuously demanded 
more radical and swifter changes than OF’s more cautious representatives intended 
[Bradley 1992 and interviews with Urban and Zbořil]. Litvák, who was a member of the 
Federal Student Strike Committee, told me that they had difficulties maintaining grass-
roots student support for continuing the strike after Havel was elected president, but that 
most of the activists in Prague wanted to continue to ensure that the democratisation pro-
cess would not slow down. 
Some of my interviews suggest that the willingness among activists to participate 
also correlated positively with its costs. In other words, when the perceived need was 
greatest, so were their efforts. Thus, Litvák says that during the first days when rumours 
of a military attack were floating, around 80 students slept in the Pedagogical Faculty’s 
building. Doležal also notes increased determination and activity among the strike leaders 
of the Philosophical Faculty on the first Wednesday, when the people’s militia faced them 
across the bridge. In addition, during the first few days, 3-4 students always slept in the 
building, so that they could become martyrs in case of an attack. 
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The second group of students took part, but did not organise such activities as go-
ing to the countryside to inform the citizens of what happened, visiting factories, distrib-
uting pamphlets, and so on. In contrast to the leaders, their utility of participating seemed 
to at first increase and then decrease over time, while they were negatively influenced by 
increased costs. Thus, all the students I interviewed except Doležal claim that the number 
of students engaged in these activities increased during the second week,10 after the Polit-
buro had already resigned, the people’s militia had left Prague and the chances of vio-
lence had already become remote. In addition, they also claimed that the participation 
level sharply decreased after 3-4 weeks. Jan Urban, who co-ordinated the student activi-
ties in the countryside with OF, notes a similar trend. Two factors probably played a role: 
on the one hand, the excitement of starting a revolution wore off after a while; on the 
other hand, the expected result of continuing their actions decreased, once Havel was 
elected president, around three weeks after the strike had begun. 
The last group were the passive supporters who attended the weekly meetings in 
the beginning and perhaps attended a few demonstrations. All of the students leaders 
whom I asked claim that the number of students attending the weekly meetings increased 
in the second week and then dropped. They do not believe, however, that this increase 
indicated greater support, but rather it reflected the fact that many students had missed the 
first Monday meeting because they had spent the weekend in the mountains. They at-
tended the following week’s meeting to get more information on the strike, and then, 
perhaps after attending a few more demonstrations, considered the strike an extended 
vacation and went back to the mountains. Among this group, it is hard to determine what 
their utility functions looked like, but after the initial joy of being able to publicly state 
their opinion, the benefit of being active sharply decreased with time. Moreover, since 
this group did not guard the university buildings or take part in other risky activities, the 
perceived costs of participating were higher for them than for the other two groups. 
Conclusion 
The Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia exemplifies some of the limitations of rational-
choice approaches to social movements. This article shows that the free-rider problem 
does not exist in cases of short, non-violent revolutions that are based mainly on demon-
strations. Under such circumstances, many people experience participation as a benefit 
rather than a cost. At least this is true in the short term. 
The main collective action problem for the ‘political entrepreneurs’, then was not 
to give selective incentives for people to join the revolution. Rather, the main problem 
was communication. The students and dissidents had to spread the news to the populace 
that their demonstrations were taking place, a new organisation OF had been formed, and 
that a nation-wide general strike was to take place. Since the Communist Party enjoyed 
monopoly control over the mass media, this was quite a difficult task. Once the citizens 
were informed about the situation, it was rather easy for the revolutionaries to mobilise 
them. 
                                                     
10) Otherwise, he agrees with the general trend that the number of participants decreased with 
time, even though the costs had decreased. He claims that around 800 were active the first week, 
about half that amount the second week, and that after one month, it became difficult to find stu-
dents who were willing to guard the faculty building. 
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This does not mean that rational choice cannot account for this aspect. It was per-
fectly rational for the political entrepreneurs to ignore public choice theory and concen-
trate on communication rather then devising means of selective incentives. Furthermore, 
it was perfectly rational for the populace to understand that if the dissidents and students 
could succeed in spreading their message, it meant the country was in a new political 
situation. Thus, the citizens could calculate that the political entrepreneurs had a chance 
to succeed in overthrowing the system. This analysis does show, however, that public 
choice theory must broaden its framework. 
In examining the threshold model several problems were found. First, it risks being 
tautological. Any time a revolution succeeds, the theorist can claim that it is because 
something happened that lowered the thresholds enough to induce the populace to par-
ticipate. Any time the revolution fails, the theorist can claim that it is because the thresh-
olds were not lowered enough. Thus, by definition the theory is always correct. The 
second problem is that the model leaves out the most important issues. It says nothing 
about what kinds of measures tend to lower people’s thresholds, nor does it say anything 
about under what conditions these measures are likely to take place. 
Finally, the threshold model assumes that the utility of participation remains stable 
over time. Thus, it cannot explain why participation levels in Czechoslovakia and East 
Germany declined after a period. Interviews with student activists indicate that the utility 
of participation actually increased over time for the student leaders. The second group 
was the students, who participated in activities, but did not organise them. For this group, 
the utility of participation appears to have quickly increased and then slowly decreased. 
Finally, there were the passive supporters. They attended the meetings and demonstra-
tions in the beginning, and then saw the revolution as a chance for an extended vacation. 
For this group, the utility of participating appears to have dropped sharply over time. 
Of course, one must be careful in drawing too strong conclusions from interviews. 
It would have been better if extensive statistics about the participation of students were 
available. Nevertheless, the results indicate that the threshold model should be refined to 
take the time question into consideration. For even if more exact statistics might show 
that this article’s hypotheses about the utility functions of the various groups is not com-
pletely correct, the fact that participation levels in both Czechoslovakia and East Ger-
many undoubtedly declined over time demonstrates that the utility of demonstrating can 
vary over time. 
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